120 quintales de plata (silver or coinage) was paid. It is believed that principales (elders) sold communal land to pay the ransom, which they shipped by mule train two hundred kilometers to the capital and delivered directly to Barrios himself. The president reportedly remarked, on receiving the money, "I will not bother Cantel again as long as my attentions are focused on uniting Central America; after that we'll see what will happen."2 This implicit threat ended with Barrios' death six months later during his ill-fated unification campaign.
In one form or another, this story plays a prominent role in both local and foreign constructions of the town's history. Today in Cantel, oral and written accounts circulate commemorating the seven martyrs (Barrios ordered another Cantelense executed in the capital a few days later) who defended communal land against the establishment of a textile factory by a powerful ladino family. In 1958, 74 years after the massacre, during an attempt by the municipality to establish political jurisdiction over resident factory workers, the town erected a monument to the seven.3 Another memorial hangs in the municipal salon; through the 196os, the town's schools commemorated the execution with an annual holiday; and to this day, a bust of Barrios is "held prisoner" in a makeshift prison cell in a municipal building. The large stone cross still stands amid grazing sheep and drying laundry in the old cemetery overlooking the river valley and the factory, its chiseled words evoking the memory of those whose "hatred of tyranny made them martyrs."
Local chroniclers are not alone in depicting the 1884 execution as a milestone in the relationship between an indigenous community and a modernizing liberal state. Foreign scholars likewise highlight the event as the inevitable violent result of a reforming state's attempt to transform the subsistence agricultural production and communal political relations that supposedly distinguish indigenous communities. Anthropologist Manning Nash has emphasized the Cantelenses' fear of change in their opposition to the factory, while more recently, historian Jim Handy has cited the episode as an example of how an indigenous community "steadfastly resisted" land and labor reforms brought about by the state. 4 Thus, both anthropologists of the 1950S concerned with modernization and contemporary historians interested in peasant resistance depict the event as a turning point in state-community relations. The continuing success of an industrial factory has become the ironic symbol of an agro-export elite's triumph over subsistence-based indigenous communities in its project of rationalizing land tenure and mobilizing plantation labor.
Meanwhile The intent of this essay is to provide a close historical ethnography of Cantel's political relations by examining how social actors, both Indians and ladinos, subjectively experienced global processes of state formation and capital accumulation-processes that Guatemalan historiography often assigns "objective status" and places outside the purview of the "ethnographic gaze."'2 In Cantel, at least, Mayan relations with the ladino state and elites went well beyond "reaction and avoidance." The land and labor laws of the coffee state did have a dramatic effect on Cantel's social relations; but as this essay will argue, that effect can be understood only by examining intracommunal divisions, tensions, and contradictions, as well as extracommunal alliances and social integration. While this point is important in providing a deeper understanding of state formation, it has more than heuristic relevance. For this essay will also argue, perhaps counterintuitively, that it is these very divisions, contradictions, and relations that account for Cantel's high degree of cultural survival and self-awareness.
As I researched this article, I was surprised time and again at how often popular accounts of town history paralleled their supposedly more sophisticated academic counterparts.'3 Not only do both types of narratives present the execution as symbolic of tensions between an Indian community and a ladino state, they both tend to elide internal communal differences and tensions. It would be hard to find a better description of primitive capital accumulation than the story that Cantelenses had to sell communal land to save the town from destruction. When I first read of this extortion, I dismissed it as a myth. But then, in a local archive, I found the following single Many Cantelenses made their living supplying wheat and wood to neighboring towns and cities. Throughout the nineteenth century, demand for both products increased. This demand, combined with a sharp increase in population, altered Cantel's internal relations of production. At the heart of communal tensions leading to the execution was a struggle between Cantelenses who made their living as aserradores (woodcutters), and therefore wanted to maintain "communal" access to woodland, and those who wanted to privatize municipal forests into agricultural land. Both opposing factions used the language of community to further their interests. As the reforms and opportunities of the Liberal state intensified communal divisions, these competing groups increasingly appealed to the central government to arbitrate their conflicts, which in turn produced the contradictory effects of increasing community identification while at the same time strengthening the power of the state. This essay's endpoint, then, is the execution. Not, however, because it symbolically represents the state's final penetration into indigenous communities, for Cantel's history continues to this day. Rather, because the search for answers to the simple questions, Whodunit? and Why did they do it? will bring us a bit closer to understanding nineteenth-century Guatemalan state formation.
The Municipio of Cantel
The town of Cantel is situated in the western highland department of Quezaltenango, five miles southeast of the department capital of the same name. The municipio sits on the southern edge of the altiplano, just at the point where the sierra quickly drops off to hot Pacific coastal lowlands.
As it emerged from colonial times, the town bore many of the trademarks of corporate communities described by Mesoamerican anthropologists.'6 Village elders held a complex of religious and civil offices, exercising moral and political authority. Six cofradias were operating in the pueblo by the 1870s. Municipal offices, usually two alcaldes (mayors) and four regidores (council members), remained completely in indigenous hands throughout the nineteenth century. Unlike many neighboring Indian communities, moreover, Cantel's population remained almost completely K'iche throughout the nineteenth century, with no non-Indians as late as 1878, despite the town's proximity to the department's capital city. 17 Despite these hallmarks of corporate culture, Cantel had considerable interaction with neighboring towns. Along with other similar K'iche-speaking communities, as well as the two urban administrative centers of Quezaltenango and Totonicapan, it made up a social and economic complex that had once formed the western confines of the pre-Spanish K'iche kingdom.'8 At the end of the eighteenth century, these towns were intertwined in a network of local and far-reaching regional trade. Cantel's incessant nineteenth-century land struggles can be explained only in relation to its regional integration. While population growth precipitated the town's land crisis, intracommunal relations of production mediated its form. As suppliers of lumber and fuel, Cantelenses needed to preserve large tracts of municipal land as forest. In 18o0, Cantel had within its borders 46 caballerias of land (1 caballer(a equaled 112 acres).27 Two-thirds of this municipal land was cypress and pine forest, covering large hills on the municipio's eastern and southern outskirts. As an important source of revenue for some Cantelenses, this land was vigorously protected, both from external incursions and internal attempts to cultivate it. Thus, with a growing population needing access to agricultural land, the only way Cantel could preserve forest land was to expand north. Expanding north, however, entailed constant conflict with both neighboring Indian communities and the Hacienda Urbina, the largest in the highlands, which annually produced thousands of bushels of wheat and corn.28
For decades before and after independence, Cantelenses fought the hacienda in the courts and in the fields over boundaries and grazing rights. Even after Cantel purchased the hacienda in 1833, the conflict continued.29 Cantel's municipality paid 10,976 pesos to the hacienda's owners, the Ayerdis family, for a little more than 31 caballernas.30 While the purchase was made collectively as a corporation, the money was raised through contributions from both well-to-do vecinos and cofradias. The land was then divided among the contributors, with a portion set aside for the agricultural needs of comuneros.3' Whether rent was to be paid on this land is unknown. What is clear from subsequent attempts to regain expropriated land is that the wealthier contributors clearly regarded the land they received as private property, although they continued to refer to it in its totality as an ejido, or commons. played a crucial role in the events and decisions leading to the purchase of the hacienda. The large tract they received in the purchase and the later restoration no doubt sustained many families in the community, binding the Colops in a web of extended patriarchal relations. That a relative was first alcalde when the land from the 1833 purchase was distributed only tied together individual, filial, and communal interests even more.
Considering the complex and changing society in which nineteenthcentury Guatemalan Indians lived-a world of political revolutions, separatist movements, rebellions, local conflicts, intrigues, regional commerce, epidemics, and natural disasters, as well as everyday happiness and frustration-there is no reason to believe that indigenous identities and interests were not equally as intricate, evolving, and contradictory. The municipio was not a crucible in which competing identities dissolved and homogenized, but a contested arena that competing interests claimed as their own. In their disputes, both sides insistently presented themselves as vecinos del pueblo de Cantel. As coffee capitalism spread, population and production pressures increased, and communal divisions deepened, however, these competing factions increasingly had to appeal to the state to back up their demands, furthering the process of state formation. Within less than a year of their loan, Colop, Xacalxot, and Morales were writing the corregidor for redress; which indicates that at least for these three, the state was something more than a political last resort.
The Coffee State
The formation of states, much like the making of classes, is not something that happens like the rising of the sun "at an appointed time."45 Whatever general characteristics the Guatemalan state manifested nationally, its formation was always also local. 46 In 1871 registration fees, population and agricultural censuses, and labor laws, along with new mechanisms to collect, count, and enforce. Underwriting all of these changes was an expanded military, usually headed by local caudillos.
In the department of Quezaltenango, both the expanding coffee economy and numerous public works projects demanded more labor than was readily available.47 In the 188os a public and private building boom was under way. Not only did the ladino elites build roads, bridges, ports, and railroads to meet their export needs, but the city of Quezaltenango became a public showcase for Liberal ideals. The city council began construction on a new municipal palace (larger than the national palace in Guatemala City), built an imposing departmental penitentiary, opened schools, widened boulevards and lined them with trees, laid out public gardens, erected statues to Liberal martyrs, and drained swamps.48
Both the 1873 contribucio'n de caminos, designed to supply workers for public projects, and the 1877 mandarniento, a colonial forced-labor draft retooled to fit the needs of coffee finqueros, placed the responsibility of supplying needed labor on indigenous authorities. Local alcaldes were required to fill labor requests made byjefes polfticos. If the request was for a mandamiento, usually an agent of the finca bearing the jefe polftico's order would arrive in the pueblo to distribute a cash advance to the needed workers.
These measures to appropriate indigenous labor took on striking variations even within close territorial proximity. In the region surrounding Cantel, these variations were most vivid between the Mam towns northwest of the city of Quezaltenango and the K'iche towns (including the city itself) to the southeast. A look at the municipal origins of the indebted peons reveals the corvee's differential impact on highland communities. Information on 1,302 colonos from the Costa Cuca coffee region just southwest of the city reveals that while 378 were from Mam-speaking towns, only 71 were from the K'iche towns of Cantel, Zunil, Almolonga, and Quezaltenango.49 Only 3 colonos came from Cantel. The importance of these towns as regional suppliers of basic grains and raw materials, plus their proximity to larger urban centers, provided inhabitants of these K'iche communities with leverage to resist the mandamiento.
Economic integration and location may not have been all that spared them. Cantel's authorities repeatedly claimed that all the able men not already working on coastal fincas were employed within the town limits. "All are contracted with the sefiores agricultores of this pueblo, cultivating corn and wheat. The harvest of wheat, which is the progress of our country, has just begun."50 Debt data exist for six wheat-and corn-growing farms in Cantel.5' In 1894, at least 43 Cantelenses were indebted more than 15 pesos each to 6 landowners, at least 4 of whom were K'iche and vecinos of Cantel.
A number of obvious questions arise. Were these contracts simply a means of avoiding the labor draft? Or were they an economic gloss for more "traditional" kinship or clan relations? Did they represent real labor relations in the community? If they did, were they long-established or recent additions to village production patterns? As we have seen, individuals or families in Cantel owned what amounted to large tracts of private property. While the specific attitudes, norms, and social relations governing the cultivation of those lands remain unclear, Cantel was a wheat-exporting town. Whether through relations of wage, kin, or clan, some residents of the town did work for others on enterprises that made money, and probably had done so for some time.
Thus, rather than resistance to labor drafts successfully forming within networks of communal autonomy and solidarity, in Cantel and Quezaltenango it was actually regional integration and intracommunal stratification that tempered the effects of the mandamiento. Socially homogeneous and isolated towns in the Mam region were hard hit by the labor drafts, while in Cantel and Quezaltenango, potential corvee victims found refuge in the interstices of intracommunal labor relations.
The Family and the Factory
In many ways, the 1871 Liberal revolution represented a final triumph of the old Estado de los Altos, the highlands' shortlived separatist movement (1837-39)-this time extended throughout the country.52 Barrios himself was from the Los Altos department of San Marcos, and immediately after the revolution, he returned to the highlands to consolidate his power asjefe politico of Quezaltenango before assuming the presidency in 1873. Altenses in exile or politically dormant during the long Carrera period now assumed a prominent place in national politics. If the economic base had changed over the decades -moving from regional trade to coffee production -many of the players, or at least the families, remained the same.
One such family, For decades before the Liberal triumph, the cornerstone of any highland industrial development the Altense elites may have dreamed of was a textile factory. A textile industry, Altenses believed, would both stimulate cotton cultivation and provide cheap, locally produced textile products to the highlands' dense population. Following the Liberal revolution, Francisco Sanchez received government permission to build a factory. From its inception, it was a large-scale, ambitious operation. An 1887 inventory lists 13 buildings, including 7 dormitories for workers, residences and offices for managers and the director, and a large cement structure with an iron roof that contained the weaving and spinning machines.57 Workers, as many as a thousand by the turn of the century, processed ginned cotton into white cloth using technology and machinery imported from Oldham, England.58
The family located the factory in Cantel both for the town's proximity to Quezaltenango and Totonicapan and its location on the river, which powered In many ways, the construction and later operation of the factory was primitive capital accumulation at its most transparent. From 1882 on, Manuel Lisandro Barillas, the jefe politico of Quezaltenango, gave direct mandamiento orders to Cantel and other towns to supply the workers needed to transport materials and to build the factory and its immediate infrastructure.60 Indians hauled rocks from quarries in Totonicapan and carried spinning and weaving machines from the nearest coastal railroad station up into the highlands. Municipal authorities complained that the workers were not paid sujtusto precio and were treated inhumanamente.i A factory of this scale needed adequate roads and bridges for its transport activities; work gangs were ordered to widen and fix both the road from Cantel to Quezaltenango and the road to the coast. The state not only mobilized Cantel's labor, but also expropriated its revenue. In November 1882, Delfino Sanchez, acting as minister of development, ordered that "the funds belonging to the cofradias of Cantel be applied to the construction of two bridges that are needed . . . in the pueblo and . . . on the road to Quezaltenango." 62 Needless to say, many in Cantel were not at all happy with the coming of the factory and the labor and revenue demands that accompanied it. Indeed, discontent with Liberal reforms had already manifested itself several years earlier. On August 6, 1878, Casimiro Sacalxot, a principal and member of the municipal council, returned from the capital and, claiming that he carried orders from Barrios, called together 25 vecinos to take his fellow councillors prisoner. Sacalxot charged the municipal authorities with abusing their role as community leaders by "selling people to the jefatura polftica so that they could be put to work on the roads." He also accused them of imposing more than the legal fee to register births in the civil registry. power by community authorities were linked to the regional ladino state apparatus, and were usually, as in this case, tied to labor and revenue demands. As land disputes and other pressures in the community increased, so did challenges to those authorities. While appeals to state officials were nothing new, village leaders increasingly came to depend on extracommunal relations with ladinos to prop up their weakened position. Sacalxot and his followers held the council members hostage for 24 hours in the municipal building; they were released only when the jefe polftico sent a squadron of ladino militia to free them.
Second, it is possible that Sacalxot actually did meet with Barrios in the capital. A U.S. traveler wrote in 1884 that on arriving at the national palace, she found
In the courtyard . . . 75 or loo Indians from the country, sitting and lying on the ground in the sun, waiting hours and hours and sometimes all day for a chance to pay their respects to him. As soon as he came in sight every Indian rose and took off his hat. Many were satisfied with a mere glance, while others had some trivial complaint to offer. These complaints were often somewhat amusing, but Barrios always listened to them attentively, and with a few words and a pat on the head sent the Indian off perfectly happy.64
Did Sacalxot sit for hours in the sun in the palace courtyard, hoping to gain a brief audience with the president? Did he creatively misinterpret "a few words and a pat on the head" from Barrios as a blessing to take hostage his municipal colleagues? Whatever the case, this is precisely how he justified his and his followers' actions.
Aside from the obvious appeal to a higher and absent authority, what is especially interesting is that Sacalxot's tactics echoed past protest strategies. Cantelenses often used the divergence of local and national interests to press their own demands. Community leaders would appeal legally and emotionally to higher authorities seeking judicial redress and protection, while at the local level they Despite his Liberal rhetoric, Barrios was very much the capricious and paternalistic caudillo, dispensing his wrath and largess as need or whim dictated. His hands-on management style toward indigenous communities, undoubtedly perfected during his years as a coffee finquero and Quezaltenango's jefe polftico, often entailed a mix of psychology and legal inconsistency. In 1881, for example, he ordered the jefe polftico of Quezaltenango to free three Indians from the town of Zunil who participated in a riot: "put them at liberty with a scolding . . . and warn them that if they continue as such I will come to punish them severely." 72 A few months later, he ordered the alcalde of Zunil to expel "three or four of the most perverse" of ten local troublemakers, explaining that "with this it will be enough that the remain- In Cantel, continuing population growth and an increasing demand for corn, wheat, wood, and pasture strained the community's precarious balance of subsistence and commercial production. Combined wheat and corn production increased from 21,000 bushels in 1840 to 40,000 in 1878.75 Starting in the 1870s, the number of requests from Quezaltenango for wood increased, and with them municipal complaints of rapid deforestation from illegal cutting, both by Cantelenses and Indians from the neighboring community of Zunil.76 In 1882, municipal authorities increased the number of guardabosques assigned to patrol the forests.7 And in 1892, a reforestation project was ruined by the illegal pasturing of sheep, which destroyed thousands of cypress trees planted the year before.78
Demographic and production pressures, combined first with the specter of a huge factory and then with the expropriation of a large tract of forest, all within a political context that weakened municipal authority and autonomy, turned Cartel's everpresent tensions and fissures into gaping rifts.
Antonio Colop Estrada and the Community
What historians might identify as communal tensions, historical actors often experience as opportunities; moments when they can deploy the language and symbols by which people understand their world to change that world. With ambition, impertinence, and political acumen, one such Cantelense, Antonio Colop Estrada, emerged as the leader of a faction in the increasingly disputatious relations of Cantel's municipal politics. The jefe polftico, Barillas, agreed that Colop Estrada had taken more land than was granted and had distributed and sold it to more people than he was authorized to do. Colop Estrada never denied the charges, defending himself with an interesting appeal to Liberal paternalism.
If, as James C. Scott suggests, the task of peasants is to stay out of the archives, Colop Estrada did not do a very good job.79 Complaints from other Cantelenses over his machinations, along with Colop Estrada
Senior presidente, you know very well that land under the communal system produces little or nothing. Is it prudent and economical to take these lots from us so that they can be placed again under the . . . unproductive system of communal property? We are going to be left without even a little land where we can plant corn for our children.86
Colop Estrada responded violently to attempts to redistribute the land equitably, at one point threatening a municipal officer with a revolver and at another, counseling the wife and daughter of a socio to attack a Cantelense trying to reclaim land.87 During 1885 and 1886, the municipality issued more than a dozen complaints to the jefe polftico about Colop Estrada and his hold over the other grantees. "Only in crime do they maintain themselves by the counsel of Antonio Colop Estrada and to this day they have not stopped harassing the whole town."88 Colop Estrada's mastery of Spanish, which in 188o had allowed him to defend the community, now helped him advance his personal interests. As one municipal officer observed, Colop Estrada was able to take advantage of poorer and less educated vecinos because "the poor find themselves in The events so far described might lead to the conclusion that in Cantel, discontent over internal and external land expropriation, plus increased labor and revenue demands associated with the coming of an industrial factory, drove many citizens to participate in a regional conspiracy against the government; and that the government, caught up in its international political maneuvering, reacted with unusual harshness. While no smoking gun exists linking Barrios to the crime, the circumstantial evidence is compelling. But one piece is still missing.
Machine Age Machinations
In his book Machine Age Maya, Manning Nash writes that the Cantelenses' fear of novedades (new things) may have driven them to oppose the factory."2 Even today, standing at the edge of the town center, some three hundred meters above the river valley, it is easy to understand how foreign academics and Cantel's own local intellectuals have seized on the factory as an apt symbol for the Indian community's ongoing relations with ladino society. If now, among milpas and mountains, the complex seems incongruous, more than one hundred years ago the impact of its size and noise must have been awesome. Records of the firm's land acquisitions, however, indicate that the coming of the factory inspired more than awe in some Cantelenses.
In 1890 the Sainchez factory owned 578 cuerdas of land in Cantel, which it had acquired in four separate land transactions."3 On July 21, 1881, the factory purchased 150 cuerdas from 37 Cantelenses for 875 pesos."4 When the Sainchez family registered the land a few weeks later, its size had inexplicably increased by more than one acre."5 The sale took place four months after Barrios personally ordered the measurement of the factory's future site, and at least five of the 37 Cantelenses who sold the land were either implicated by Colop Estrada in his June 1884 accusation or arrested after the invasion, including one of those eventually executed, Ramon Chojolan. And although the notary recording the sale declared that the municipality had granted the land in 1873, the sellers did not receive a title until just one month before the transaction."6
The next three transactions are even more suspicious. rather than repercussion and to miss the "multiple perspectives" of causality and consequence.
Cantel was embedded in a network of intra-and extracommunal social relations conditioned by their particular historical and ecological context. The contradictions within these social relations intensified as coffee capitalism spread and the Liberal state formed. A growing population demanded that more land be turned over to agricultural production, while relatively privileged yet increasingly politically isolated woodcutters fought to keep land "communal." Divisions within the community were not new; but combined with the pressures of a consolidating state, the arrival of an immense industrial factory, the commodification of land and labor, and international political maneuvering, they divisions created an explosive situation resulting in the 1884 execution. Without an understanding of these complex relations, the actions of Colop Estrada, Barrios, and the S'anchez family would be meaningless.
After the events of 1884, the government decreed that privatization of Cantel's 30 caballerias of woodland would continue, this time taking care to assure that all landholders received no more than 30 cuerdas each. In 1889, however, an attempt to distribute the land to 468 vecinos met with fierce resistance by "89 woodcutters of Cantel who impeded the distribution of the ejido."'128 The grantees complained that even though they had marked off their lots, the woodcutters continued to harass them to the point that they were not able to cultivate the land.
As late as 1ggo, Christopher Lutz and George Lovell could still state that it would be "unproductive" to portray all Indians "as subjects, not objects, as players who shaped their social situation as much as they were conditioned by it." Guatemalan society remained "made up essentially of two social classes, the 'dominant' and the 'dominated,' the conqueror and the conquered."'129 Evidence presented in this essay suggests, however, that it is important to examine subaltern agency not just out of political sympathy, but so as to comprehend the very tenacity and endurance of the state.
Within a historical field of force, some social classes and groups retain more power than others.'30 Guatemala was transformed into an agroexporting nation. A seasonal agricultural proletariat, made up mostly of Mayans, was created, and the nature of exploitation changed. But it does no justice to those exploited to ignore how power functions within "dominated" This essay has demonstrated how, time and again, Cantelenses with disparate access to political, economic, and cultural resources interacted with the state, contributing to its ongoing reproduction. Liberal land and labor laws reconfigured communal relations and led to an increase in intracommunal confrontation and violence; but they did so along already existing lines of cleavage. These tensions were caused as much by the community's internal dynamics as by external pressures. Even the external pressures were not always the product of an imposing state, but sometimes a result of Cantel's long-established integration in Guatemalan society. Increasing demand for wood and wheat, for example, had significantly changed Cantel's internal relations of production.
What the Liberal state did most effectively, and to its own benefit, was lift the veil of communal representation to reveal the multiple interests and contradictions lurking beneath. New leaders, such as Colop Estrada-who, because of his literacy, ability to speak Spanish, and communal authority, could take advantage of tensions between milperos and aserradores -emerged to represent those interests. This representation, however, entailed the contradictory effect of deepening community identification while reinforcing the state's power. As social tensions increased, competing factions relied to an ever greater extent on the language of community to justify their claims. But in a context of weakening political authority and growing stratification, these leaders increasingly had to call on the state to back up those claims. In Cantel, the state did not arrive unexpectedly in 1871; it was an invited guest.
By stressing extracommunal economic and political ties and intracommunal tensions and stratifications, this essay has argued against essentialized and static notions of ethnicity and community. In doing so it may have unintentionally resurrected the specter of "the rational peasant" who is only loosely constrained by community relations and the community ethos.132 It is true that Antonio Colop Estrada was an optimizer if ever there was one. Yet The colonel spoke of the need for Cantelense men to protect their property, wives, and daughters from violence and crime perpetrated by los subversivos. His speech was cut short when the crowd spontaneously started hissing and yelling that it was really the army that routinely committed the crimes and violence. Many listeners simply turned their backs. Angrily, the officer concluded the meeting. A week later, a second attempt to form a patrol ended with the same result. Keeping in mind that this occurred at an extreme moment of army repression, which left 440 communities destroyed and tens of thousands dead -indeed, scores of Cantelenses disappeared fol-lowing the two meetings -this must be deemed a remarkable confrontation. While other communities have since had PACs disbanded, Cantel is possibly the only town that successfully refused to participate in the program from the start.
Again, it can be argued that Cantel's very integration and diversity gave it the wherewithal to resist the PAC. Many, if not most, of Cantel's men work either in the factory or in Quezaltenango. The military is less able to interfere in this type of economic activity than in the local agricultural and commercial enterprises that some more remote pueblos still rely on. It is easier to burn crops and destroy a town on market day than it is to stop a paycheck.'38 Many Cantelenses, moreover, are members of trade unions, either in the textile factory or in Quezaltenango.'39 "We factory workers are more awake," one told me, suggesting the level of organizational and ideological experience needed to forestall the patrol. Cantel, possibly because of schools established and supported by the factory, has not only the highest level of literacy among Indian communities in the western highlands, but a higher rate than the republic as a whole, perhaps affording Cantelenses the critical ability to evaluate military propaganda.'40 Finally, one local account claims that the repression following the failed meetings ended only when a Cantelense member of Rios Montt's evangelical congregation telegraphed the president, asking him to call off the army; which might indicate that extracommunal affiliations contributed to the successful act of resistance.
Whereas integration and diversity may have created the social space needed for resistance, however, this is not how Cantelenses themselves explain the event. When I asked how Cantel, unlike any other Maya community, was able to prevent the formation of a PAC, all those I interviewed, to a person, invoked a group cohesiveness and drew on a memory of collective resistance. "Somos gente culta" and "Tenemos un conocimiento de nuestra historia" were two of many similar responses I received. Nearly all mentioned the 1884 execution, "when Barrios came to destroy the town because we loved freedom."
The paradox of popular memory in Cantel is that while it homogenizes differences and smooths out tensions so as to provide a discursive space where resistance can be articulated, it is, to a large degree, generated from 
